Abstract. It is shown that propositional intuitionistic logic is the maximal (with respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain topological property reminiscent of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under asimulations.
Introduction
The well-known characterization of classical first-order logic by Per Lindström (published as [15] ) has had a great deal of repercussion in contemporary logic. The key development inspired by that paper was the introduction of a notion of "extended first-order logic" that encompassed a great number of expressive extensions of first order logic 1 which let Lindström establish, roughly, that there were no extensions of classical first order logic that would also satisfy the compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems. A nice accessible exposition can be found in [10] .
Lindström's theorem single-handedly started a new area of research known as abstract or soft model theory (cf. [1, 2] ). These two adjectives are used since, when working in this field, one finds themself using "only very general properties of the logic, properties that carry over to a large number of other logics" ( [1] , p. 225). Some common examples of such properties are compactness, the Craig interpolation theorem or the Beth definability theorem.
Naturally, there is no reason why one could not do non-classical abstract model theory as well, this time focusing on some non-classical logic and its structures. An interesting survey of this much less developed field can be found in [12] . The most prominent work has been done in the case of modal logic. A succession of increasingly improved results were obtained by a number of authors such as de Rijke ( [6] ), van Benthem ( [21] ), Otto and Piro ([20] ) and, more recently, Enqvist ([8] ). Indeed, Enqvist's result is a bit more general than the others and it serves as inspiration for this paper. It roughly states that the basic modal language is the most expressive logic (over any class of relational models axiomatizable in first order logic by a collection of strict Horn formulas) satisfying the so called Tarski union property, invariance under bisimilarity and compactness. 1 This was soon replaced by the now more common term "abstract logic". In fact, probably the term "model-theoretic language" ( [9] ) is more accurate, depending on one's views of what a "logic" is.
The goal of this paper is to obtain a theorem in the vein of Enqvist but for intuitionistic models, an intuitionistic language, replacing invariance under bisimulation for preservation under asimulations and compactness by a topological property more suited to a boolean negationless context. The notion of an asimulation was introduced in [16] 2 and used to characterize the expressive power of intuitionistic languages as fragments of first order logic over any class of structures axiomatizable by a first order theory. Later the notion of asimulation was modified to capture also expressive powers of intuitionistic first-order logic [17] , various systems of basic intuitionistic modal logic [18] , and also some systems which are not connected with intuitionistic logic at all [19] .
Our work will be of interest not only because it deals with probably the second most famous non-classical logic but because it will be a contribution to abstract model theory without Boolean negation, a subfield where not many results are known.
The layout of the remaining part of the present paper is then as follows. In Section 2 we establish the main bits of our notation and define some basic concepts. Section 3 is then devoted to proving some less immediate lemmas on intuitionistic unravellings and intuitionistically saturated models. In Section 4 we define the notion of an abstract intuitionistic logic and formulate our main result. We prove such result in the next section. In Section 6 we provide topological interpretation of the main theorem. We end the paper by suggesting some lines of further inquiry.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the language of intuitionistic propositional logic, which we identify with its set of formulas. This language is generated from some set of propositional letters by a finite number of applications of connectives from the set {⊥, ⊤, ∧, ∨, →}; the connectives are assumed to have they usual arities. The set of propositional letters can be in general arbitrary large, but we assume that it is disjoint from the above set of connectives (and from the set of logical symbols of every logic which we are going to consider below). Any set with this property we will call vocabulary. Intuitionistic propositional formulas will be denoted with Greek letters like ϕ, ψ and θ,relation, and V is the evaluation function for Θ in M, that is to say, a function V : Θ → 2 W such that for every p ∈ Θ and arbitrary s, t ∈ W , it is true that:
If M and N are two intuitionistic Kripke Θ-models then we say that M is a submodel of N and write M ⊆ N iff W ⊆ U , R = S ↾ (W × W ) and, for every p ∈ Θ, V (p) = Y (p) ∩ W . In general, for every W ⊆ U there exists a corresponding submodel M of N with W as its universe. In such cases we may also denote M by N (W ).
If M 1 ⊆, . . . , ⊆ M n ⊆, . . . is a countable chain of intuitionistic Kripke models then the model:
is again an intuitionistic Kripke model.
A pointed intuitionistic Kripke Θ-model is a pair of the form (M, w) such that w ∈ W . In this paper, we are not going to consider any non-intuitionistic Kripke models. Therefore, we will omit the qualification 'intuitionistic Kripke' in what follows and will simply speak about (pointed) Θ-models. We assume the standard satisfaction relation for IL(Θ):
note that the formulas of IL(Θ) get satisfied at pointed Θ-models rather than at models alone. Since classical negation is not available in intuitionistic logic, intuitionistic theories are often defined to include falsehood assumptions along with truth assumptions (this is done in e.g. [11, p. 110] w.r.t. intuitionistic first-order logic). Thus an IL(Θ)-theory becomes a pair (Γ, ∆) ∈ 2 IL(Θ) × 2 IL(Θ) , where formulas in Γ are assumed to be true and formulas from ∆ are assumed to be false. If (M, w) is a pointed Θ-model, then we define T h IL (M, w), the IL(Θ)-theory of (M, w), as follows:
We also introduce a special notation for the left and right projection of T h IL (M, w), that is to say, for the positive and for the negative part of this theory, denoting them by T h + IL (M, w) and T h − IL (M, w), respectively. Inclusion of intuitionistic theories must then involve set-theoretic inclusion of their respective projections, so that we define:
It is clear then that an IL(Θ)-theory (Γ, ∆) is IL-satisfiable iff we have (Γ, ∆) ⊆ T h IL (M, w) for some pointed Θ-model (M, w). In this case we will also write M, w |= IL (Γ, ∆). If M ⊆ N and for every w ∈ W it is true that T h IL (M, w) = T h IL (N , w), then we say that M is an IL-elementary submodel of N and write M IL N . We end this section with some definitions and brief discussion of asimulations and some other related notions relevant to the subject of this paper. Definition 1. Let (M 1 , w 1 ), (M 2 , w 2 ) be pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called an asimulation from (M 1 , w 1 ) to (M 2 , w 2 ) iff for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any v ∈ W i , s, t ∈ W j , any propositional letter p ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
Intuitionistic propositional formulas are known to be preserved under asimulations. More precisely, if (M 1 , w 1 ), and (M 2 , w 2 ) are pointed Θ-models and A is an asimulation from (M 1 , w 1 ) to (M 2 , w 2 ), then T h
. Moreover, preservation under asimulations is known to semantically characterize IL as a fragment of classical first-order logic, see [16] for the proof.
Asimulations are defined as an intuitionistic version of bisimulations, a well-known concept from classical modal logic. In fact, bisimulations can be even defined as symmetric asimulations. It follows then that if B is a bisimulation between (M 1 , w 1 ) and (M 2 , w 2 ) then B is an asimulation both from (M 1 , w 1 ) to (M 2 , w 2 ) and from (M 2 , w 2 ) to (M 1 , w 1 ). Further, given a pair of pointed Θ-models (M 1 , w 1 ) and (M 2 , w 2 ) and a bisimulation B between them, we get that
Asimulation is not the only concept from which bisimulation arises as its symmetric version; another (and more traditional) notion of this kind would be simulation which is defined as follows:
any propositional letter p ∈ Θ the condition (elem) holds together with the following conditions:
Note that in the definition of asimulation one finds stronger versions of clauses (type) and (atom), hence the labels (s-type) and (s-atom). The label (s-back) also indicates a strengthening of a more traditional back-clause (given that the symmetry of A is not guaranteed).
Simulations are clearly related to homomorphisms, which we define, a la [3] , as follows:
, any propositional letter p ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
It is clear that the main difference between simulations and homomorphisms is that the latter are functions while the former are relations. We will see in the next section that a sort of connection between the two can be established and this fact is important for our result.
A stronger version of asimulation in the context of intuitionistic logic would be an IL-embedding defined as follows:
It is easy to notice that whenever f is an IL-embedding of
) with a copy of M 1 changes nothing. Therefore, whenever there exists is an IL-embedding of M 1 into M 2 we may assume that M 1 IL M 2
Intuitionistic unravellings and saturated models
In this section, we treat some less immediate properties of intuitionistic logic. We start by introducing a further piece of notation. If (o 1 , . . . , o n ) is an n-tuple of objects of any nature, then we will denote it withō n .
Unravelling Kripke models is another well-known item from classical modal logic. Here we adapt it to the intuitionistic setting. For a given intuitionistic pointed Kripke Θ-model (M, w), the model M •
w is the reflexive and transitive closure of the following relation:
The following lemma sums up the basic facts about intuitionistic unravellings:
w is reflexive and transitive. Moreover, we note that for arbi-
Therefore, to show antisymmetry, assume that for a givenw k ,v n ∈ W un w we havē w k R un wv n ∧v n R un ww k . By the above biconditional it immediately follows that k ≤ n ∧ n ≤ k so that we have k = n and, further, thatw k =v k . Therefore, we getw k =v n and thus R un w is shown to be antisymmetric.
To show monotonicity of V un w w.r.t. R un w , assume that for somew k ,v n ∈ W un w we havew k R un wv n . Then we have both k ≤ n andw k =v k , so that, in particular, we get
whence, by monotonicity of V w.r.t. R, it follows that for every p ∈ Θ, if v k ∈ V (p), then v n ∈ V (p). It remains to notice that, by definition of V un w we have both
As for the bisimulation B between (M un w , w) and (M, w), it can be defined as follows: We state here one more lemma on intuitionistic unravellings relevant to our main result:
Lemma 2. Let (M, w) and (N , u) be pointed Θ-models, and let Z be a simulation from (M Proof. Suppose that there is total simulation Z from (M un w , w) to (N , u). We then define h by induction on the length ofv n ∈ W un w . The base case is whenv n = w and we set h(w) := u. If n = k + 1, then h(v k ) must be already defined by induction hypothesis, and we must also havev k Z h(v k ). Also, we havev k R un wvk+1 . But then by condition (forth), there must be some s ∈ U such that h(v k ) Z s andv k+1 Z s. Choose one such s and set h(v k+1 ) := s. Sincev k , the immediate predecessor ofv k+1 different fromv k+1 in M un w is unique (naturally, there might be other predecessors of v k+1 but they have to lay belowv k ), h is a function with the required properties.
Let (Γ, ∆) be an IL(Θ)-theory and M be a Θ-model. If v ∈ W , we will say that (Γ, ∆) is finitely IL-satisfiable in M by successors of v iff for all finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and
. A Θ-model M is called IL-saturated iff for every v ∈ W and for every IL(Θ)-theory (Γ, ∆), whenever (Γ, ∆) is finitely IL-satisfiable in M by successors of v, then for some u ∈ W it is true that v R u and M, u |= IL (Γ, ∆). The importance of intuitionistically saturated models is that among them asimulations can be defined in the following easy and natural way:
and both M 1 and M 2 are intuitionistically saturated, then the relation A such that for
Proof. The relation A, as defined in the lemma, obviously satisfies conditions (s-type), (elem), and (s-atom) given in Definition 1. We check the remaining condition, (s-back).
Assume that u A s, so that T h
, and let for some t ∈ W j we have s R j t. Let (Γ ′ , ∆ ′ ) ⊆ T h IL (M j , t) be finite. Then, of course, we have:
and, by u A s:
The latter means that (Γ ′ , ∆ ′ ) must be IL-satisfied by some R i -successor of u. Therefore, by intuitionistic saturation of both M 1 and M 2 , we get that for some v ∈ W i such that u R i w the theory
, which, in turn, means that both w A t and t A w.
Abstract intuitionistic logics
An abstract intuitionistic logic L is a pair (L, |= L ), where L maps every vocabulary Θ to the set L(Θ) of Θ-formulas of L and |= L is a binary relation between pointed models and elements of L(Θ) for some vocabulary Θ such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• If M and N are Θ-models, φ ∈ L(Θ) and f is an isomorphism between M and N , then for every w ∈ W it is true that:
•
that is to say, L is closed under intuitionistic implication, conjunction and disjunction. We further define that given a pair of abstract intuitionistic logics L and
If both L L ′ and L ′ L holds, then we say that the logics L and L ′ are expressively equivalent and write L ≡ L ′ . It is easy to see that intuitionistic propositional logic itself turns out to be an abstract intuitionistic logic IL = (IL, |= IL ) under this definition. It is also obvious that the above definitions and conventions about intuitionistic theories can be carried over to an arbitrary abstract intuitionistic logic L replacing everywhere IL with L, including such notions as elementary submodel, embedding, saturation of a model, etc. In particular, since the relation |= L never distinguishes between isomorphic models, the remark after Definition 4 holds for arbitrary intuitionistic logics L.
In this paper, our specific interest is in the extensions of IL. Since every abstract intuitionistic logic L extending IL must have an equivalent for every intuitionistic propositional formula, we will just assume that for every vocabulary Θ we have IL(Θ) ⊆ L(Θ) and that for every ϕ ∈ IL(Θ) and every pointed Θ-model (M, w) we have that:
so that all the intuitionistic propositional formulas are present in L in their usual form and with their usual meaning, and whatever other formulas that L may contain are distinct from the elements of IL(Θ).
We can immediately state the following corollary to Lemma 3 for arbitrary extensions of IL:
To prove this, we just repeat the proof of Lemma 3 using the fact that every Lsaturated model is of course IL-saturated.
Some of the extensions of IL turn out to be better than others in that they have useful model-theoretic properties. We define some of the relevant properties below.
• L is invariant under asimulations, iff for all vocabularies Θ and arbitrary pointed Θ-models (M 1 , w 1 ) and (M 2 , w 2 ), whenever A is an asimulation from
We have mentioned above that in the case of IL invariance under asimulations implies invariance under bisimulations. The same argument holds in the case of arbitrary abstract intuitionistic logic L. In other words, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4. If L is an abstract intuitionistic logic that is invariant under asimulations, then L is invariant under bisimulations. In other words, for arbitrary vocabulary Θ and arbitrary pointed Θ-models (M 1 , w 1 ) and (M 2 , w 2 ), if B is bisimulation between (M 1 , w 1 ) and (M 2 , w 2 ), then:
Moreover if an abstract intuitionistic logic is invariant under asimulations, then every formula of this logic is monotonic w.r.t. accessibility relation. More precisely, the following lemma holds:
Proof. We define asimulation A from (M, w) to (M, v) setting: We need to show that if ϕ ∈ IL(Θ), n ∈ ω and w ∈ W n , then
this is done by induction on ϕ and the only non-trivial case is when ϕ = ψ → χ. If M n , w |= IL ψ → χ, then there is a v ∈ W n such that w R n v and M n , v |= IL ({ψ}, {χ}). But then, by induction hypothesis we must have n∈ω M n , v |= IL ({ψ}, {χ}) and we also have w ( n∈ω R n ) v so that n∈ω M n , w |= IL ψ → χ. In the other direction, assume that n∈ω M n , w |= IL ψ → χ. Then, for some v ∈ n∈ω W n such that w ( n∈ω R n )v it is true that n∈ω M n , v |= IL ({ψ}, {χ}). But then, for some k ≥ n, we must have both w, v ∈ W k and w R k v, so that we get M k , w |= IL ψ → χ. By obvious transitivity of IL we get then that M n IL M k , whence M n , w |= IL ψ → χ.
Our main theorem is then that no proper extension of IL displays the combination of useful properties established in Lemma 6. In other words, we are going to establish the following:
L and L is invariant under asimulations, intuitionistically compact, and has the TUP, then IL ≡ L.
The proof of Theorem 1
Before we start with the proof, we need one more piece of notation. If L is an abstract intuitionistic logic, Θ a vocabulary, and Γ ⊆ L(Θ), then we let M od L (Θ, Γ) denote the class of pointed Θ-models (N , u) such that for every φ ∈ Γ it is true that:
We now start by establishing a couple of technical facts first: Proposition 1. Let L be a almost strong S-closed abstract intuitionistic logic extending IL. Suppose that IL ≡ L. Then, there are φ ∈ L(Θ φ ) and pointed Θ φ -models
Proof. Suppose that for an arbitrary φ ∈ L(Θ φ ) we have shown that: 
However, this means that the theory ({φ}, Ψ (N ,u) ), we get that:
Now, Γ is a perfectly good formula of IL(Θ φ ) involving only finitary conjunctions and disjunctions. So we have shown that every φ ∈ L(Θ φ ) is just an intuitionistic Θ φ -formula and hence that L ≡ IL which is in contradiction with the hypothesis of the proposition.
Therefore, (i) must fail for at least one φ ∈ L(Θ φ ), and clearly, for this φ it can only fail if
But the latter means that for some pointed intuitionistic Θ φ -model (M 1 , w 1 ) such that M 1 , w 1 |= L φ there is another Θ φ -model (M 2 , w 2 ) such that both M 2 , w 2 |= L φ and T h + IL (M 1 , w 1 ) is satisfied at (M 2 , w 2 ). The latter means, in turn, that we have T h
Assume M is a Θ-model. We define that Θ M is Θ ∪ {q N , v) . Indeed, conditions (type) and (atom) are obviously satisfied. We treat condition (forth).
Assume 
By definition of [M un w ] and closure of L w.r.t. intuitionistic implication, we have that the set:
We also know that, byv k R un wvn , and by the fact that the theory ({q For this f , we get condition (theories) immediately by definition of Z. To establish the injectivity of f assume thatv n ,ū k ∈ W un w are such thatv n =ū k . Then, by Lemma 1, eitherv n is not an R
If the second, then a symmetric thing happens with q 
we know wlog that:
where Γ is a finite subtheory of T h
is a finite subset of (Γ i , ∆ i ) and, again for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n: ,∆i) ). It is easy to see then, that every such (Ξ 0 , Ω 0 ) will be L-satisfied in the extension of ([M 
, and we may assume that w 1 is the root of M ′ 1 (if not, throw away every world which is not accessible from with f (w) = w 1 . We now prove the following:
Indeed, we have (Γ, ∆) ∈ F inSatv k , and we also have [M
Again by Expansion, we get that (Γ, ∆) will be L-satisfied at (M 1 , u ′ ) and further, by Lemma 1.
andū r (R 1 ) un w1 (ū r , u ′ ). Therefore, setting u := (ū r , u ′ ), we get our Claim verified. Observe further, that by the remark after Definition 4, the existence of the abovedefined embedding f means that we may assume that [M as N i . We consider then i∈ω N i . Since L has TUP, we know that for every j ∈ ω we have
)-theory which is finitely L-satisfiable among successors of some v in i∈ω N i . Then for any finite (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ) ⊆ (Γ, ∆) we will have
Then choose j ∈ ω such that N j is the first model in the chain, where v occurs. By (1), we will have:
. Therefore, (Γ, ∆) will be finitely L-satisfiable in N j by successors of v and by the respective version of our Claim above, this means that there is a successor
-model, then setting N to be Θ-reduct of i∈ω N i , we immediately get that N is L-saturated. Also, by (1) and the fact that M We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1. Indeed, assume the hypothesis of the theorem, and assume, for contradiction, that L ≡ IL. By Proposition 1, there must be φ ∈ L(Θ φ ) and pointed intuitionistic Θ φ -models (
On the other hand, we will still have T h w 2 ) , whence by Corollary 1 there must be an asimulation A from (N 1 , w 1 ) to (N 2 , w 2 ), but then, since L is invariant under asimulations, we must also have T h
which is a contradiction.
A topological approach to the main theorem
There is a topological reading of our result. This sort of take on Lindström theorems has been explored by some authors, in particular, Caicedo (see [5] ). One of the fundamental interests of such an approach is that logical compactness properties become topological compactness properties. To see this, for each vocabulary Θ, we must first define a topology (to be called the intuitionistic topology for Θ −indeed, the reference to Θ will be dropped when the context makes it clear that some Θ has been fixed) on the the space of all intuitionistic pointed Θ-models (call it S for the purposes of this section). Abstract logics will then roughly correspond to topologies on such space. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of general topology that can be acquired in a place like [13] .
We start by introducing a closed base B for our topology. The elements of B have the form M od(φ) for some formula φ in the usual language {→, ∧, ∨, ⊥, ⊤} of intuitionistic propositional logic. B is a closed base for a topology on S because for any two A, B ∈ B there is W ∈ B such that A∪B = W : given M od(φ) and M od(ψ), consider M od(φ∨ψ). The intuitionistic topology is just the topology induced by this base, that is, take as closed collections arbitrary intersections of elements of B.
Now we may observe that we ended up with a topology where the closed collections have the form M od(T ) for some intuitionistic set of formulas T . Denote 2 IL(Θ) with ℘(F mla). In particular, given a subclass A of the space, if we denote by T h + IL (A) the collection of all intuitionistic formulas holding in every member of A, then A − , the closure of A in our topology, is just T ∈℘(F mla)
The space is not normal (i.e., it is not the case that for any two disjoint closed classes A, B there exist disjoint open classes U, V containing A and B respectively), for let M od(T ) ∩ M od(U ) = ∅ for two intuitionistic theories such that M od(T ) = ∅ and M od(U ) = ∅. Moreover, suppose that M od(T ) ⊆ S\M od(T ′ ), and M od(U ) ⊆ S\M od(U ′ ) for some intuitionistic theories T ′ , U ′ . Now take any structure (M, w) ∈ S \ M od(T ′ ) and (N , v) ∈ S \ M od(U ′ ), but this means that for some φ ∈ T ′ and ψ ∈ U ′ we have that φ and ψ fail at (M, w) and (N , v) respectively, so neither φ nor ψ are theorems of intuitionistic logic. But intuitionistic logic has the disjunction property (⊢ φ ∨ ψ only if either ⊢ φ or ⊢ ψ), so in fact there is some (M ′ , w ′ ) ∈ S such that φ ∨ ψ fails, which implies that (M ′ , w
). The space is not regular (i.e., it is not the case that closed classes and exterior points may be separated by disjoint open classes). Take any M od(T 0 ) = ∅ and (M, w) / ∈ M od(T 0 ), i.e., M, w |= IL φ for some φ ∈ T 0 . Consider further arbitrary open classes S \ M od(T 1 ) and S \ M od(T 2 ) such that M od(T 0 ) ⊆ S \ M od(T 1 ) and (M, w) ∈ S \ M od(T 2 ). Hence, taking (N , v) ∈ M od(T 0 ), it must be in S \ M od(T 1 ). So there are ψ ∈ T 1 and θ ∈ T 2 such that N , v |= IL ψ and M, w |= IL θ. By the disjunction property, we have (C, u) falsifying both ψ and θ, hence the intersection (S \ M od(T 1 )) ∩ (S \ M od(T 2 )) cannot be empty.
The space is compact because each family of closed sets which has the finite intersection property has a non-empty intersection (this is just the content of the compactness theorem in intuitionistic logic −hence Rasiowa's name for this theorem), which is equivalent to saying that every covering of the space can be reduced to a finite subcovering.
Moreover, the space is connected. To see this we again use the disjunction property of intuitionistic logic. For suppose that S = A ∪ B for separated subsets A, B = ∅. The space is not Hausdorff because given two models satisfying exactly the same intuitionistic formulas (that is, they belong to exactly the same closed classes of the topology) but which are not isomorphic, so they are distinct, we have a violation of the definition of a Hausdorff space: given two distinct points in the space we can find disjoint neighborhoods of each of them. In fact, we get with this example that the space is not T 1 : there are distinct points x, y such that for every open classes A, B of the intuitionistic topology, x ∈ A only if y ∈ A and y ∈ B only if x ∈ B. Even worse, the space is not even T 0 : by the same example we have got points x, y such that there is no neighborhood of x where y doesn't belong. Naturally, the latter observation suffices to refute the earlier properties.
Now we look at a related topology that plays an important role in our main result. Consider the collection SB * containing all collections of the form S \ M od(φ, ⊥) and S \ M od(⊤, ψ) for all intutionistic formulas φ and ψ. This forms an open subbase for a topology on S. The open base B * generated from SB * is just all classes of the form M od(φ, ψ) for intuitionistic formulas φ and ψ (this collection simply contains all finite intersections of members of SB * ). Open classes in this topology are of the form φ∈Φ,ψ∈Ψ M od(φ, ψ) for some collections Φ, Ψ of formulas. A topological space is said to be strongly S-closed if every family of open sets with the finite intersection property has a non-empty intersection [7] . Moreover, we will say that a space is almost strongly S-closed if every family of basic open sets with the finite intersection property has a non-empty intersection. The topology is almost strongly Sclosed this follows from the fact that every cover of S by members of the subbase has a finite subcover . The latter comes from the intuitionistic compactness of intuitionistic logic. Moreover, the topology is uniform, we can obtain it from what we will call (borrowing from [5] ) the canonical uniformity, namely the uniformity generated by the base formed by the subclass U ⊆ S × S containing: Another space that may be interesting to explore is the quotient space obtained from the following equivalence relation on S: x ≈ y iff x, y belong to exactly the same closed classes of the intuitionistic topology. Now consider the quotient topology for the natural projection π : S −→ S\ ≈. This topology takes as the closed classes all those subclasses U of S such that π ∈ M od(φ) and (N , v) / ∈ M od(ψ) for some φ ∈ T and ψ ∈ U , so using the disjunction property, we get some (M ′ , w ′ ) such that (M ′ , w ′ ) / ∈ M od(φ ∨ ψ), which means that [(M ′ , w ′ )] ∈ U ∩ V . Finally, the main theorem of this paper may be read as: for any vocabulary, the intuitionistic topology is the finest topology such that (i) its closed sets are closed under asimulations, (ii) it has the Tarski-Union property and (iii) the subbase of the topology of the canonical uniformity is such that every open cover of the space by members of the subbase has a finite subcover.
Conclusion
We have succeeded in establishing a Lindström characterization of intuitionistic propositional logic over intuitionistic models involving the properties of intuitionistic compactness, the TUP and preservation under asimulations. In future work we will show how this characterization can be extended to the case of predicate intuitionistic logic. Our work, of course, opens a world of new questions. A particularly immediate one is to find some other combination of interesting model theoretic properties that implies the three mentioned properties and would therefore give us a new intuitionistic Lindström theorem.
On the other hand, it would be nice to work out the details of what is the algebraic content of our result via duality theory. Pointed intuitionistic models are dual to Heyting matrices (that is, pairs formed by a Heyting algebra and a filter on such algebra), so the work reduces to investigate the algebraic counterparts of the TUP and the preservation under asimulations.
